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ABSTRACT 
Executive remuneration has been under intense scrutiny by both investors and the 
media over the past 10 to 20 years because of the increasing magnitude of these 
remuneration packages (Otten, 2007; Sapp, 2007). This research report explores 
the relationship between executive director remuneration and the performance of 
publically listed companies (JSE) in South Africa, as well as ascertaining whether 
any relationship exists between director profiles and director remuneration. 
 
The study population comprised all South African companies listed on the JSE 
during 2014. The final sample consisted of 49 companies after the transformation of 
the data. A total of 708 director profiles were examined. The results of the study 
appeared to indicate a lack of correlation between executive director remuneration 
and company performance in publically listed South African companies. On the 
other hand, the results of the regression provided empirical support for the 
existence of a significant positive relationship between director remuneration and 
total assets.  
 
The results also illustrated that, in general, directors who are male over the age of 
50 and who have served as directors for periods of between six to 10 years receive 
higher total remuneration compared to other classes of directors. It was also noted 
that race appeared not to play a role in director remuneration. 
Key words: Executive director remuneration, executive director profiles, company 
performance, ROA, Tobin’s Q
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In recent years, there have been very few issues that have elicited as much ongoing 
controversy in the world as the issue of executive remuneration (De Wet, 2012; 
Otten 2007). The global financial crises (GFC) have borne witness to several notable 
collapses in the corporate industry (Nelson, Gallery and Reza, 2011). Elstone (2008) 
mentions that economists believe that the recent economic downturn is the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Consequently, the economic 
downturn has spurred the media on to pay more attention to the ongoing increases 
in executive remuneration (Nelson et al., 2011; Sapp, 2007, Otten, 2007). There has 
been much research conducted in this area. However, the focus of the research has 
been the United States of America (USA), Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Europe (De Wet, 2012). 
 
The following statements highlight this interest in executive remuneration: “CEOs 
getting staggering pay despite big problems at their companies” (Colvin, 2008). 
“Where has the link gone between performance and pay?” (Trump, 2005). 
“Company directors and executives are self-interested actors, using their position in 
the company to pursue their own ends rather than being focused on pursuing what is 
best for the company” (McConvill, 2005). Colvin (2008) further mentions that, in 
general, the remuneration of CEOs is staggeringly high despite the severe problems 
being experienced by their companies and the need for compensation to be aligned 
to performance. 
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McConvill (2005) explains that the large compensation packages of many companies 
which have collapsed, including companies, such as the US insurance company 
Fannie Mae, WorldCom and Enron, to name a few, has heightened the scrutiny of 
both investors and media. These compensation packages are also important 
because their structure determines the executives’ “incentives and thus influences 
how the company will be operated” (Sapp, 2007).  
 
A recent publication by Deloitte (2014) indicated that the remuneration of directors is 
increasingly one of the most hotly debated topics in the corporate governance arena. 
This is primarily the result of certain infamous recent examples of company collapses 
as mentioned earlier and the subsequent tension between directors and 
shareholders, with the latter demanding to understand and to be able to rationalise 
their directors’ remuneration levels and methods of remuneration while, on the other 
hand, the directors wish their financial affairs to remain private (Deloitte, 2014). This 
debate also focuses on the levels of quality, especially in publically traded 
companies (Fernandes, 2005). 
 
In general, directors tend to raise several issues relating to the disclosure of the 
reasons for the various compensation packages paid to their respective executives 
(Otten, 2007). As a result, there is a growing perception of company directors as 
self-interested actors (Nelson et al., 2011; Scholtz and Smit, 2012), with 
shareholders believing that directors are using their positions in the company to 
pursue their own needs rather than focusing on the best interests of the company 
(McConvill, 2005).  
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Woodburn (2008) highlighted the prevailing belief that it is the role of the executive 
directors of a company to create growth and generate profits for the shareholders. 
However, shareholders then often ask the question as to whether, if executives fail to 
create value and profits, should they be entitled to a salary increase and 
performance-related remuneration (Woodburn, 2008).  
 
Ghosh (2003) mentions that the issues of board structure, executive compensation 
and company performance have been discussed in detail in both the theoretical and 
the empirical literature, although the effect of the size and composition of the board 
on company performance is a debatable issue. In their article, Cooper, Gulen and 
Rau (2009) mention the following: firstly, politicians and the media had argued that 
the executive compensation practices have been pushing employees to take short-
term risks with little regard for the long-term effect of such risks on their companies. 
Secondly, recent regulatory proposals had been proposed, for example, that more 
pay be offered in the form of restricted stock or other forms of long-term 
compensation designed not to reward short-term performance. Finally, long-term 
compensation plans offer incentives to executives to act in the best interests of 
shareholders in the future, to the extent that markets do not fully incorporate pay 
information when it is made public. 
 
The correlation between the way in which executives are remunerated and whether 
that remuneration is in line with company performance has, thus, become a 
controversial topic worldwide, including in South Africa (Bradley, 2013). De Wet 
(2012) mentions that the directors of top South African companies are receiving 
bonuses even when the profits are decreasing by substantial margins. However, the 
12 
 
introduction in the King III report in 2009, which requires that companies adopt 
remuneration policies over the long term, may help to bridge this gap (Scholtz and 
Smit, 2012; IOD, 2009). 
 
1.2 Corporate governance issues in South Africa 
An agency relationship, defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976), as “as a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent, allows managers to indulge in opportunistic 
behaviour that serves their own interests and not necessarily those of shareholders, 
while suggesting that executives may build and increase the size of the firm because 
of the power and prestige related to managing a large firm. Accordingly, corporate 
governance is concerned with how best to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of 
executives (Amess and Drake, 2003). 
 
Executive remuneration is a device, which owners may potentially use to create 
financial incentives for executives to reduce their opportunistic behaviour. Ideally, an 
employment contract should stipulate that the executive remuneration is equal to the 
marginal product of labour. Company profitability is, however, a consequence of both 
managerial effort and several external factors that are outside the executives’ 
control. It is, thus, not always possible to determine the effort put in by the 
executives involved accurately by merely taking into account company profits. In 
other words, the formulation of employment contracts is often problematic due to the 
difficulties associated with unforeseen contingencies and the principal–agent 
problem (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
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The board of directors of a company is the main internal control mechanism through 
which shareholders are able to control managers. In view of the problems associated 
with a dispersed ownership structure, this internal control mechanism is particularly 
important for creating transparency and bridging the agent–principal gap (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). It is the board’s role to examine the highest decision-makers, 
usually executive directors, in the organisation and, thus, the board plays a vital role 
in ensuring that the executive directors of a company fulfil their fiduciary duty to the 
owners. It is often argued that although the executive directors have a fiduciary duty 
to protect the owners’ interests, if they do not have any financial interest in the 
company and they stand to gain little from the performance gains the company 
makes, they may not fulfil this fiduciary duty (Amess and Drake, 2003). 
 
The discussions on executive remuneration in South Africa have been dominated by 
the widening income inequality between executives and ordinary workers, 
particularly in the South African mining industry, which is facing a challenging time. 
The discussions on the mining industry have been fuelled primarily by media reports 
on perceived pay for no performance and the alleged link between excessive 
executive compensation and instability in the sector (Theku, 2010). Questions have 
been asked as to whether the level of the salary disparity between executives and 
the lowest paid workers in the mining industry has negatively affected company 
performance. This is mainly because of the fact that the high-income inequality is 
broadly seen as the catalyst for labour disputes which usually result in a loss of 
production time (Steyn, 2013). 
 
According to Blair (2014), many measures may be used to manage executive 
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remuneration and general business conduct in South Africa environment in order to 
ensure both sound practices and sustainability. One of the main regulatory 
measures aimed at ensuring good corporate governance is the King Ill code on 
executive remuneration, which was introduced by the IOD in 2009. The main 
purpose of this code is to provide the business community with the requirements for 
integrated business reporting (IOD, 2009). 
 
The King III report on corporate governance in South Africa was deemed to be 
necessary because of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) and changes in 
international governance trends (IOD, 2009). Foreign investors regard listed 
companies in South Africa as ranking among the best governed in the world’s 
emerging economies. It is essential that the country strive to maintain this high 
ranking (IOD, 2009). As was evident in the significant capital inflows into South 
Africa before the global financial crisis of 2008, the South Africa’s economy has 
benefited significantly from the fact that its listed companies adhere to sound 
governance principles and practices (IOD, 2009).  
 
King III is a report that builds on the pertinent issues raised by King I and King II. 
However, the report also discusses the inclusion of issues such as sustainability, 
governance, the role and function of the audit committee, stakeholder relationships, 
compliance with laws and regulations and integrated reporting (IOD, 2009). King III 
notes that the board of directors should be responsible for the affairs of the company 
by determining the company’s strategic direction in a lawful and efficient manner in 
such a way as to ensure that the company is constantly improving its value creation 
and performance (IOD, 2009).  
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In addition, the board should ensure that the value being created is shared with the 
shareholders and employees with due regard to the interests of other stakeholders 
(IOD, 2009). In order to carry out these responsibilities the board must ensure the 
integrity of the financial controls and reports while also ensuring that the ethical 
standards of the company are maintained and that the company complies with the 
laws of South Africa (IOD, 2009). 
 
Principle 2.18 of the King III Report and section 66(2)(b) of the Companies Act 2008 
recommend that the composition of the board of directors should include a balance 
of power, a mix of executive and independent non-executive directors and a majority 
of independent non-executive directors (IOD, 2012). King III further recommends 
that the board should be composed in such a way as to ensure a diversity of 
experience without compromising the integrity, compatibility, availability and 
independence of the board (IOD, 2012). The introduction of King III created a need 
for further research into the relationship between executive director remuneration 
and company performance (Scholtz and Smit, 2012). 
 
1.3 Statement of the research problem 
The debate on inflated sums being paid to CEOs is not new, as shareholders expect 
executive directors, who are paid high salaries to perform, prove their worth and 
grow the company (Tariq, 2010). There have been several steps taken to reduce the 
widening gap between executive director remuneration and company performance. 
These steps include the introduction of the Greenbury report in 1995 in the UK and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the USA (Tariq, 2010). Scholtz and Smit (2012) 
suggest that the pay–performance link may have become even stronger after the 
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introduction of King III in 2009 as the report requires that companies must adopt 
remuneration policies over the long term in order to try to bridge the remuneration 
and the transparency of how executive directors are remunerated in South Africa. 
 
1.4 Research question 
The main research question is as follows: Is there a significant positive relationship 
between executive director remuneration and the company performance of publically 
listed companies in South Africa (JSE)? 
 
The abovementioned research question was the main focal point of the study, 
although further sub-questions were formulated with a view to further investigating 
the relationships between executive director profiles and executive director 
remuneration. These profiles include categories such as age, race, gender, 
educational qualifications, tenure and meeting attendance. These sub-questions are 
further explained in chapter 3 of this report. 
 
1.5 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this report was to explore the relationship between the remuneration 
of the executive directors of listed companies in South Africa and company 
performance and to investigate the link between executive director profiles and 
executive director remuneration. The relationship between executive directors’ 
remuneration and company performance was analysed using data drawn from South 
African companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Performance 
measures such as Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), total assets and revenue in 
the South African context were used. 
17 
 
1.6 Significance of the study 
The significance of this study lies within the South African context. The study 
attempted to analyse the relationship between the executive director remuneration 
and company performance for all the companies listed on the JSE. In similar studies, 
Bradley (2013), De Wet (2012), Scholtz, and Smit (2012) limited their studies to 
certain industries listed on either the JSE or the Alternative Exchange (AltX) in South 
Africa. 
 
These recent studies found several contradictory results. The study conducted by 
Bradley (2013) in South Africa found no correlation between CEO compensation and 
company performance, thus suggesting that attempts to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders through executive pay in South Africa have so far been 
unsuccessful. Bradley (2013) also suggested that companies that attempt to use 
executive pay as a method of mitigating the conflict of interest that exists between 
managers and shareholders should consider their approach carefully. In fact, it may 
be necessary for companies either to change their pay structure or to consider 
alternative means in order to align the interests of managers and investors (Bradley, 
2013).  
 
On the other hand, a study conducted by Scholtz and Smit (2012) found evidence of 
a strong relationship between executive remuneration and certain company 
performance indicators, such as the total assets, turnover and share price for 
companies listed on the AltX. De Wet (2012) also found strong evidence of a 
significant relationship between executive remuneration and company performance. 
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This report seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge in three ways. 
Firstly, the measure of remuneration employed included salaries, profit-related-pay, 
bonuses, benefits and options as disclosed. In their studies, De Wet (2012) and 
Scholtz and Smit (2012) ignored options. The inclusion of these additional 
components was deemed important for the purposes of this study because they may 
be used to align the interests of managers with those of the owners. Secondly, the 
study explored the relationship between the executive remuneration and company 
performance of all companies listed on the JSE. Finally, the study also investigated 
the relationship between executive director remuneration and executive director 
profiles. 
 
1.7 Layout of the study 
This chapter clarified the issue of director remuneration. It also stated the research 
problem, the purpose of the research study given the limitations of previous research 
in the field, the significance of the study in South Africa and the main research 
question addressed in the study. The rest of the report is organised as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the relevant literature. The purpose of the 
literature review is to provide a foundation for the study as well as to highlight the 
relevance of companies aligning their director remuneration with company 
performance. 
 
Chapter 3 expands on the main research question and further explains the sub-
questions developed for the purposes of the study. The chapter further describes the 
methodology used in the study, discusses the methods of data collection used, the 
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process of data analysis and the key variables used in the study. The latter part of 
the chapter explains the validity and reliability of the data used, as well as the 
assumptions, limitations and delimitations of the study.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the research results relating to executive director remuneration 
and company performance, as well as to the relationship between executive director 
profiles and executive director remuneration. 
 
Chapter 5 summaries’ the study and the research questions, while providing 
conclusions to the research questions. The chapter further provides and 
recommendations for future research into this field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Investopedia (2015) defines Corporate governance as: 
… the system of rules, practices and processes by which a company is 
directed and controlled. Corporate governance essentially involves balancing 
the interests of the many stakeholders in a company – these include its 
shareholders, management, customers, suppliers, financiers, government and 
the community. Since corporate governance also provides the framework for 
attaining a company's objectives, it encompasses practically every sphere of 
management, from action plans and internal controls to performance 
measurement and corporate disclosure.  
 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), corporate governance determines the ways 
in which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of receiving a 
return on their investment. On the other hand, Maradi, Navi and Dasar (2015) define 
corporate governance is a process that aims to allocate corporate resources in a 
manner that maximises value for all stakeholders, employees, customers, suppliers, 
the environment and the community at large. They further define corporate 
governance as the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting 
the way in which a company is directed, administered or controlled. Corporate 
governance also refers to the relationships between the many stakeholders involved 
and the goals in terms of which the corporation is governed. 
 
Sheng (2000) defines corporate governance as a means to ensure the accountability 
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of certain individuals in an organisation through mechanisms that endeavour to 
reduce or eliminate the principal–agent problem. This definition is most apt for this 
research study as it links corporate governance to agency theory. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) stated that one of the key objectives of modern corporate 
governance is to address agency problems. The following sections contain an 
overview of agency theory as well as the literature consulted on director 
remuneration and firm performance. 
 
2.2 Agency theory, executive pay and the link to company performance 
Executive compensation refers to the main financial rewards and benefits that are 
granted to executives in exchange for their contribution to the company. The main 
aim of executive remuneration is to maximise shareholder value by effectively 
rewarding, motivating and retaining valuable senior management in the company 
(Shaw and Zhang, 2010). Scholtz and Smit (2012) highlighted that the structure of 
executive remuneration has changed considerably over time, while Crowley (2013) 
stated that CEO salaries had been increasing at an exceedingly high rate, while 
dividends per share over the same period had decreased significantly. These 
researchers point out that research has been conducted only into whether executive 
remuneration is an effective way of aligning the interests of shareholders and 
executive directors.  
 
Agency theory was formulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They explain that 
agency theory is an instrument that may be used to alleviate agency problems, 
defined as “a conflict of interest inherent in any relationship where one party is 
expected to act in another's best interests” by Jensen and Meckling (1976). On the 
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other hand, executive pay is an instrument, which is used to align the interests of 
shareholders and management (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Deegan (2009) provides 
evidence that, for example, the market for managers provides incentives for 
managers to work in the best interests of the owners. 
 
Agency theory is extremely important, as the introduction of the KING III report and 
Code of Governance in South Africa; companies are now required to disclose their 
directors’ remuneration in their financial statements. In addition, companies are also 
required to put in place remuneration committees to assist with setting remuneration 
packages in place, as stakeholders are now more interested in the fairness 
surrounding directors’ remuneration than ever before (IOD, 2009).  
 
Agency theory has been used many times to explain the relationship between CEO 
remuneration and company performance. However, the predominant use of this 
theory has led researchers into a so-called “blind alley” (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 
1998; Ebert, Torres and Papadakis, 2008). Almost all the research on the 
relationship between executive pay and company financial performance has been 
based on regression models that take into account a number of different economic 
variables (Ebert et al., 2008; Cheng, Lui, Shum and Wong, 2011, Nelson et al., 
2011). Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan and Zhou (2006) explained how empirical 
evidence is consistent with the agency theory view of compensation, thus confirming 
that executive pay is positively correlated with company performance.  
 
2.3 Corporate governance and executive remuneration 
The issue of the increasing magnitude of executive compensation and the weak 
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relationship between executive compensation and company performance have been 
receiving increasing attention globally (Sapp, 2007). However, according to Theku 
(2014), the role of corporate governance as an effective oversight mechanism, 
entrusted with ensuring correct management activities, which are in the best 
interests of shareholders, has always been criticised. 
 
In recent years, market forces have been assumed to lead to optimal pay levels and 
structures. This implies that executives are compensated for the risks they are willing 
to take in order to manage their companies in the best interests of their shareholders 
(Otten, 2007). Accordingly, many academic writers have now suggested that a 
number of relationships exist between corporate governance-related factors and 
executive compensation (Sapp, 2007; Nelson et al., 2011).  
 
In the early 1990s it was found that directors’ packages were not in line with their 
performance in the company (Conyon, 1997). During 2008 and 2009, the global 
financial crisis (GFC) raised concerns with regard to the strong growth in director 
remuneration packages despite poor company performance (Australia, 2009). 
Nelson et al. (2011) suggest that these remuneration packages had increased due to 
the fact the directors were required to take excessive risks and to enhance their 
decision-making capabilities. 
 
Core and Guay (2010) propose that the GFC may have occurred because of director 
remuneration structures offering either too few or too many incentives. These factors 
then raised significant concerns on the part of investors regarding director 
remuneration (Conyon, 1997). It was felt that remuneration packages should be set 
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at a level that is adequate in order to attract and retain directors with the competency 
that is required to ensure the company is successful. However, companies should 
avoid paying more than the amount required (Cheng et al., 2011). 
 
The King Report on Corporate Governance is currently the most important regulation 
in terms of corporate governance in South Africa. Subsequent to the Cadbury Report 
(European Corporate Governance Institute, 1992), which was released in Britain, the 
King Report on Corporate Governance 1994 (King I) was released in South Africa in 
November 1994 (Malherbe and Segal, 2001). It has been pointed out that King I 
made the public aware of the importance of good corporate governance, with one of 
the areas of specific focus being the need for appropriate board structures (Malherbe 
and Segal, 2001). 
 
The King committee had to ensure that the legislation catered appropriately for the 
South African labour market and, consequently, the committee needed to take 
cognisance of the unique characteristics of the country following the fall of the 
apartheid regime. During the apartheid regime, the South African labour market was 
characterised by inequalities in employment, occupation and income because of 
apartheid laws and other discriminatory rulings (IOD, 2009).  
 
In 1998 the Employment Equity Act no. 55 was passed. This Act specifically prohibits 
unfair discrimination on the grounds of, among others, race, gender and age, with 
the aim of achieving employment equity. Designated employers are required to put 
affirmative action measures in place in order to create equal opportunities for 
suitably qualified people from designated groups and to strive for equitable 
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representation of these groups in all categories and levels within the workplace. 
Designated groups include black people (defined as Africans, coloureds and 
Indians), women and people with disabilities (RSA, 1998). 
 
The King Report on Governance for South Africa was issued in 2009 (King III). The 
report took into account the Companies Act no. 71 of 2008, as well as developments 
in international governance. King III adopts a voluntary basis for governance 
compliance (IOD, 2009).  
 
The introduction of the King III Report on corporate governance created a 
requirement disclosure for salary and performance-related elements, including an 
explanation of the basis on which remuneration is to be measured. It will, thus, 
become increasingly difficult for executive directors not to be remunerated according 
to performance (IOD, 2009).  
 
2.4 King III, corporate governance and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
The King Reports on corporate governance, namely, King I (1994), King II (2002) 
and King III (2009), all addressed, among other things, the issue of executive 
remuneration. The guide to the application of King III (2012) practice notes states 
that companies should adopt remuneration policies and practices for executives that 
create value for the company over the long term. In addition, these policies should 
be in line with the company’s strategy, they should be reviewed regularly and they 
should be linked to the executives’ contribution to company performance. The guide 
further states that those factors that affect company performance, but which are 
beyond the control of executives, should be considered, albeit to a limited extent 
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(King III, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, a remuneration committee should be set in place to assist the board in 
formulating and administering remuneration policies. The committee should be 
directly concerned with the remuneration of senior executives and executive 
directors, while it should also be able to provide advice on the remuneration of non-
executive directors. The remuneration committee should review the remuneration 
policies on an annual basis to ensure that these policies are in line with company 
performance. The committee should also ensure that executives are not gaining 
inappropriately as this tends to affect shareholder value (King III, 2012). The King III 
Report also suggests that shareholders must approve the remuneration policy of a 
company, as this will increase the accountability of executive directors to 
shareholders. The report further recommends that remuneration committees, 
consisting of non-executive directors, be established to determine and monitor 
executive remuneration (IOD, 2009). 
 
Paragraph 71 of King III states: 
“Every board should consider whether its size, diversity and demographics 
make it effective. Diversity applies to academic qualifications, technical 
expertise, relevant industry knowledge, experience, nationality, age, race and 
gender (IOD, 2009:33).” 
 
Principles 2.25 to 2.27 of King III state: 
“Companies should remunerate directors and executives fairly and 
responsibly, companies should disclose the remuneration of each individual 
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director and certain senior executives and lastly, shareholders should approve 
the company’s remuneration policy (IOD, 2009).” 
 
In the past few years, there has been an increase for research conducted on 
executive remuneration. However, there appears to be no real conclusion on the 
extent of the problem and whether there is any relation between executive 
remuneration and company performance. Accordingly, this report examines the 
executive compensation of companies listed on the JSE and whether the link 
between executive remuneration and company performance has been strengthened 
since the introduction of King III (IOD, 2009). 
 
Table 2.1, adapted from Scholtz and Smit (2012), presents the corporate 
governance requirements relating to executive remuneration for directors and senior 
executives, according to King I and King II. King III also requires the specific 
disclosure of the remuneration paid to each director in terms of the Companies Act. 
Compliance with the King II Report was required for the companies, which made up 
the sample used in this study. Since the implementation of the 2008, Companies Act 
compliance with King III has now also become a requirement (Scholtz and Smit, 
2012).  
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Table 2.1: Corporate governance requirements of King II and King III relating to 
executive remuneration 
King II King III 
Performance-related remuneration 
Performance-related elements of 
remuneration should constitute a 
substantial portion of the total 
remuneration of executives. 
Short-term and long-term 
performance-related awards must be 
fair and achievable. 
Remuneration policies 
There should be a formal and 
transparent procedure for developing 
a policy on director and executive 
remuneration. This should be 
supported by a statement of 
remuneration philosophy in the annual 
report. 
Remuneration policies that create 
value for the company over the long 
term should be implemented. 
The remuneration committee should 
assist the board in setting up and 
administering remuneration policies. 
The company’s remuneration policy 
should be tabled to shareholders for a 
non-binding advisory vote at the 
annual general meeting. 
Annual bonuses 
  
Annual bonuses should be reviewed 
regularly to ensure that they are 
objective. 
Annual bonuses should relate to 
performance against annual objectives 
and be consistent with long-term value 
for shareholders. 
Share-based payments 
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Participation in the share option 
scheme should be restricted to 
employees and executive directors. 
 
The chairman and other non-executive 
directors should not receive share 
options or other incentive awards 
geared to share price or corporate 
performance. 
Vesting of rights (in cash or shares) 
should be based on performance 
conditions measured over a period 
appropriate to the strategic objectives 
of the company. The period of 
measurement should not be less than 
three years.  
Where performance conditions are not 
met, these conditions should be 
retested in subsequent periods before 
share options are awarded.  
Regular annual grants of share-based 
awards are desirable.  
 
With the implementation of the King reports, more specifically King III, it was 
expected that there would be a closer link between company performance and 
executive remuneration than before. The disclosure requirements relating to 
executive remuneration, as required by the Companies Act no. 71 of 2008 and in 
accordance with the JSE listing requirements, are contained in Table 2.2, as adapted 
from Scholtz and Smit (2012). 
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Table 2.2: Disclosure of executive remuneration in terms of the Companies Act 
2008 and the JSE listing requirements 
Companies Act 2008 JSE listing requirements 
The following must be disclosed 
separately:  
Disclosure should be made of each 
individual director’s emoluments, 
including directors who have 
resigned.  
Remuneration  
An analysis in aggregate and by 
director of emoluments paid for the 
current financial year as well as the 
preceding financial year, 
distinguishing between executive and 
non-executive directors:  
Benefits Fees for the services as director  
Pensions  Management, consulting, technical or other fees  
Payments to pension funds on behalf 
thereof  Basic salary  
Compensation for loss of office  Bonuses and performance-related payments  
Securities issued and 
  
Sums paid by way of expense 
allowances  
Service contracts. Any other material benefits received  
Remuneration includes:  Contributions to pension funds and  
Directors’ fees for services to or on 
behalf of the company,  
commission, gain or profit-sharing 
arrangements. 
Salary, bonuses and performance-
related payments,  
  
Expense allowances for which the 
director need not account,  
Contributions to any pension scheme 
not otherwise needing separate 
disclosure,  
  
Options or rights given directly or 
indirectly,  
Financial assistance for the 
subscription of options or securities 
or the purchase of securities, and  
Any loans and any other financial 
assistance. 
Remuneration and benefits must be 
shown for:  
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2.5 Link between company performance and executive remuneration 
The structural design of executive compensation is extremely challenging as, in 
general, managers are non-risk-taking wealth maximises (Noe, 2009). Noe (2009) 
also states that the individual marginal productivity and ability to make sound 
business decisions of executive directors, as measured by the results of their 
decisions, are paramount in the executive director compensation design.  
 
Numerous articles dating back to the early 1900s have been published on company 
performance and executive remuneration. Conyon (1997) found that executive pay is 
directly proportional to current shareholder returns but not to pre-dated returns. In 
their study conducted in the UK and based on the Cadbury Commission, Girma, 
Thompson and Wright (2003) found that it was difficult to establish any relationship 
between company performance and executive remuneration; while McConvill (2005), 
found that, the link between pay and performance was extremely questionable. On 
the other hand, Merhebi et al. (2006) found that executive pay was directly linked to 
company performance in companies in Australia.  
 
In more recent years, in their study Gregg, Jewell and Tonks (2010) found evidence 
of a highly positive relationship between executive remuneration and company size 
but little evidence of a relationship between executive remuneration and company 
performance. In their study, Nelson et al. (2011) found that several companies had 
Services as director of the reporting 
company, and  
All other services while acting as a 
director of the reporting company. 
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reduced their executive remuneration because of company performance decreasing 
both during and after the global financial crises.   
 
According to Theku (2014), the debate on executive remuneration and company 
performance in South Africa has been dominated by the widening income inequality 
between executives and ordinary workers in South African companies. In a research 
study conducted in South Africa, De Wet (2012) found a significant relationship 
between executive remuneration and company performance in the listed companies 
as compared to the companies listed in the USA. Scholtz and Smit (2012) found 
evidence of a slight relationship between executive remuneration and certain 
financial indicators of the companies listed on the AltX in South Africa. In addition, 
they also established the fact that such a relationship held during financial crises. 
However, contrary to this finding, Bradley (2013) found no correlation between CEO 
compensation and company performance in South Africa. 
 
2.6 Director profiles 
According to Iwu-Egwuonwu (2010), character plays an important part in defining 
who a director really is, as character comprises the set of qualities that makes 
somebody or something distinctive. There has been little research in the field of 
executive directorship and what constitutes an outstanding executive director. 
Nevertheless, the position of director is a challenging one as he or she is expected to 
advocate the interests of diverse groups of shareholders, particularly the minority 
shareholders, while at the same time avoiding an adversarial relationship with the 
executives on the board (KPMG in Malaysia, 2009).  
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The survey conducted by KPMG in Malaysia (2009) provides a basic guideline of the 
characteristics that a director should possess. The characteristics that should be 
taken into account include age, gender, race, degree/background, practices and 
length of directorship. The Korn/Ferry institute (2012) also cites these above-
mentioned characteristics as playing a role in what comprises an exceptional 
executive director. 
 
In an article in the Harvard Business Review, Sonnenfeld (2002) mentions that an 
outstanding director may be measured by the following: regular meeting attendance, 
equity involvement, board member skills, board member age and the independence 
of the director. Furthermore, Sonnenfeld (2002) mentions that, at times, the 
presence of past directors may help to influence the decisions of current directors, 
while holding current directors accountable for their decisions and choices assists in 
the development of good directors. 
 
2.7 Components of executive remuneration 
The Executive Remuneration Report of The Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee (2011) defines remuneration’ as ‘compensation’ which includes, firstly, 
short-term employee benefits such as wages, salaries and social security 
contributions, paid annual leave and paid sick leave, profit-sharing and bonuses, and 
non-monetary benefits such as medical care, housing, cars and free or un-
subsidised goods or services for current employees; secondly, post-employment 
benefits such as pensions, other retirement benefits, post-employment life insurance 
and post-employment medical care; thirdly, other long-term employee benefits, 
including long-service leave or sabbatical leave, jubilee or other long-service 
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benefits, long-term disability benefits and, if they are not payable wholly within twelve 
months after the end of the financial period, profit-sharing, bonuses and deferred 
compensation; fourthly termination benefits; and, finally, share-based payments.  
 
In their discussion paper, Ebert et al. (2008) explain that CEO remuneration 
packages comprise various components. In order to categorise executive 
compensation, several distinctions can be made. For example, distinctions should be 
made between fixed and variable compensation, compensation in cash and non-
cash compensation and, finally, between deferred and immediate compensation.  
 
Bradley (2013) categorises remuneration as any fixed payment received during the 
year that was included in the subtotal reflecting the salary. Directors’ fees, cash 
remuneration and any form of guaranteed compensation were also included, while 
short-term bonuses were deemed to include any unguaranteed forms of 
compensation. Bradley (2013) analysed salaries separately from bonuses as he was 
of the opinion that bonuses were more likely to be dependent on performance than 
the salary element. In addition, Bradley (2013) categorised all bonuses due in less 
than twelve months as ‘short term’ and included them in the remuneration 
component. 
 
A recent executive directors’ remuneration report compiled by PWC (2013) 
mentioned that long-term incentive plans and share options are too complex, while 
the performance conditions demanded by shareholders and the ‘market’ were not 
deemed to provide a strong link between rewards and shareholder value. As a 
result, many writers, including Scholtz and Smit (2012), De Wet (2012) and Theku 
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(2014), exclude long-term options and share options from their definitions of 
executive cash remuneration.  
 
The guide to the application of King III (2012), Practice Notes v2, states that, firstly, 
when proposing the remuneration policy the remuneration committee should ensure 
that a mix of fixed and variable pay in cash, shares and other elements meets the 
needs and strategic objectives of the company in question. Secondly, there should 
be a balance between the fixed components and the bonus component of the total 
remuneration of executives to allow for a fully flexible bonus scheme. Thirdly, annual 
bonuses should also clearly relate to performance as measured against yearly 
objectives consistent with the interests of shareholders. Finally, depending on the 
type of business, it may be appropriate to stipulate overriding conditions for the 
awarding of these bonuses. 
 
2.8 Definition of terms  
 Executive remuneration. Total cash remuneration of executive directors as 
disclosed in published annual reports. Cash remuneration includes basic salary, 
benefits, annual bonuses and share options as disclosed. 
 Turnover. Sales as disclosed in the statement of comprehensive income. 
 Total assets. Non-current assets plus current assets as disclosed in the 
statement of the financial position of the company. 
 Return on assets (ROA). Net income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets. 
 Tobin’s Q. The ratio of the market value of the company to the replacement value 
of its assets. 
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ܤ݋݋݇	ݒ݈ܽݑ݁	݋݂	ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ  
 
 
2.9 Summary 
Chapter 2 identified that the results from previous studies on executive remuneration 
and company performance have provided contradictory evidence worldwide. The 
components of executive pay should include basic salary, benefits, bonuses and 
share options and the definition of company performance were considered. It was 
also noted that, age, race, gender, educational qualifications, length of directorship 
and meeting attendance are all-important best components of director profiles. The 
terms that will be used in the research were then defined and included Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology used in the study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Purpose of the study and research questions  
The purpose of this research study is to explore both the relationship between the 
performance of listed companies in South Africa and their executive director 
remuneration, as well as the relationship between executive director remuneration 
and executive director profiles. 
 
3.1.1 Executive remuneration 
The literature reviewed in section 2.1 indicated that the main components of 
executive remuneration include the following; salaries, post-employment benefits, 
other long-term benefits, termination benefits and share based payments (The 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, 2011). The guide to the application 
of King III (2012), Practice Notes v2, in summary states that total remuneration, 
including annual bonuses, should be aligned to match the company performance 
and take into account the interests of shareholders. This gave rise to the main aim of 
this study. 
 
Main research question: 
Does a significant positive relationship exist between company performance and 
executive director remuneration? 
 
3.1.2 Executive director profiles 
As indicated in the literature reviewed in section 2.1, the following play an important 
role in what constitutes an exceptional executive director; namely, age, race, gender, 
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educational qualification, length of directorship and meeting attendance (Sonnenfeld, 
2002; KPMG in Malaysia, 2009; Korn/Ferry institute, 2012). This gave rise to the 
sub-research question, namely, whether or not any relationship exists between 
director profiles and director remuneration. This sub-question has been broken down 
further into the following six sub-questions as noted below: 
Sub-research question 1: 
Is there a difference in the executive remuneration of the various director age 
groups? 
Sub-research question 2: 
Is there a difference in the executive remuneration of male and female directors 
(gender)? 
Sub-research question 3: 
Is there a difference in the executive remuneration of directors from the various race 
groups? 
Sub-research question 4: 
Is there a difference in the executive remuneration of directors with different 
educational qualifications? 
Sub-research question 5: 
Is there a difference in the executive remuneration of directors who have served 
longer directorship periods as compared to those who have served for shorter 
periods? 
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Sub-research question 6: 
Is there a difference in the executive remuneration of directors who attend meetings 
on a regular basis as compared to those whose attendance is more sporadic? 
 
3.2 Overview of research method used 
The components examined in this study included executive remuneration, turnover, 
total assets, ROA and Tobin’s Q. Inferential statistics were used to identify whether 
the remuneration packages of executives were related to company performance. 
These components, which are to measure company performance, have been used in 
previous studies (Scholtz and Smit, 2012; De Wet, 2012; Mentes, 2011) and have 
proved to be the most reliable measurements of a company’s performance. 
 
This study used quantitative research as defined by Leedy and Ormrod (2005). As 
stated by Creswell (2008), in quantitative research the researcher tests a theory by 
specifying a question and then collecting data to either support or refute the findings 
in response to the question. 
 
In order to examine whether or not there was an association between the level of 
director compensation, director profiles and company performance in South Africa, 
the focus of this study was on the JSE listed companies. 
 
The research study used correlation as a research test. In other words, in 
accordance with the definitions proposed by Leedy and Ormrod (2005) and Creswell 
(2008), this study examines the extent to which differences in one characteristic or 
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variable are related to differences in one or more other characteristics or variables. A 
positive correlation exists if, as one variable increases, so does the other or vice 
versa or if a predictive relationship exists. The use of a correlation study was 
deemed to be appropriate for the purposes of this study as previous studies of this 
nature have used this method successfully, for example studies conducted by Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999), as well as Nelson et al. (2011). 
 
3.2.1 Independent and dependent variables 
The independent and dependent variables used in the study were in line with those 
used in prior research conducted by De Wet (2012) and Bradley (2013). The 
independent variables included the company performance variables, namely, Tobin’s 
Q, ROA, revenue and total assets, while the dependent variables included the 
executive director remuneration variables, namely, basic salary, bonuses, benefits, 
retention bonuses, options and total remuneration as a whole.  
 
3.2.2 Statistical models and regression analysis 
As in past research, this report also began with an analysis of the descriptive statics 
pertaining to the data collected. This included calculations of the mean, medium, 
minimum, maximum and standard deviations of the data collected for all the 
variables. The analyses of the descriptive statistics being analysed are discussed 
under the following headings, namely, univariate descriptive statistics, tests of 
normality and correlation tests and, lastly, bivariate descriptive statistics. 
The study then developed a general linear regression model to explore the 
relationship between executive director remuneration and company performance. 
This also involved carrying out numerous correlation tests and analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA) tests. Finally, the researcher performed a number of inferential tests, which 
included mainly the Mann-Whitney U test and the Kruskal Wallis test to investigate 
whether there was any relationship between the executive director profile variables 
and the executive director remuneration variables. 
 
3.3 Population and sample 
As at the 31 December 2014 there were, 352 companies per the McGregor’s Bureau 
of Financial Analysis data stream (McGregor BFA). In order to ensure that the 
comparison was meaningful, only those companies that had published annual 
reports for all five years between the period 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2014 
and, thus, for which all financial and non-financial information over the last five years 
was available, were used. Companies whose financial and non-financial information 
was not available for the previous five years were excluded as it felt they would not 
provide a reasonable comparison for the purposes of this research. It was found that 
49 companies only had data available for each of the five years for which the 
financial and non-financial statistics were required. 
 
3.4 Sample size and selection of sample 
From the total number of companies (352) listed on the JSE from 2010 to 2014 and 
included in the McGregor BFA financial database, the researcher used all the 
companies from across all the industries and whose financial and non-financial 
information was available for the period under study, namely, 2010 to 2014. 
 
3.5 Data source 
Previous writers, including Ismail, Yabai and Hahn (2014), Nelson et al. (2011) and 
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Sapp (2007), have found that many companies do not have proper annual reports 
for a particular year, either because such reports are removed or they are no longer 
available to the public. In addition, the literature indicates that some companies do 
not comply with a certain standard of orders in sorting and reporting their annual 
reports, though they do adhere to the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS).  
 
Many companies use a different order in the arrangement of their annual reports, 
although these reports include the same components such as statement of financial 
position, statement of comprehensive income and statement of cash flow. In 
addition, some companies do not clearly distinguish between independent non-
executive directors and non-independent non-executive directors on their boards nor 
do they explicitly specify the age, educational qualification or length of directorship of 
all directors (Ismail et al., 2014).  
 
In view of the difficulty involved in acquiring information from private companies, as 
well as in respect of the disclosure of director profiles and remuneration information, 
it was decided to limit the study to public companies that were listed on the JSE. For 
the purposes of the study, the extent of company performance was measured using 
the statutory annual reports. Thus, the data used in the study was collected from the 
published annual reports of companies listed on the JSE from the 2010 to 2014.  
 
The primary source of information for the study was the secondary database from 
McGregor BFA, which supplies both real-time and historical fundamental information 
on South African listed companies. The non-financial information, namely, the 
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director profiles and director remuneration data, was also gathered from the 
published annual reports. 
 
3.6 Data collection and management 
As mentioned above, the requisite data was sourced from the published annual 
reports on each company’s website and downloaded from the McGregor BFA 
financial database directly into Microsoft Excel. These workbooks were then 
managed by storing them on a laptop as well as backing them up onto an external 
hard drive and email backups. The data was collected between June 2015 and 
November 2015 and analysed from December 2015. The first research report draft 
was ready at the end of January 2016.   
 
3.7 Data analysis 
In order to make meaningful comparisons between the results of different 
companies, it was necessary to devise a standardised system of analysis. The 
standardised information for the financial data for companies listed on the JSE 
between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2014 was extracted from McGregor 
BFA.  
 
The non-financial data, company performance line items required for the study and 
executive remuneration were obtained from the companies’ website and from their 
annual financial statements.  
 
Firstly, in order to answer the question as to whether there was a link between 
executive director remuneration and company performance, correlation tests were 
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performed to investigate both the company performance variable for each company 
(Tobin’s Q, ROA, revenue and total assets) and the executive director remuneration 
variable of each executive director (basic salary, benefits, bonuses, retention 
benefits, options and total remuneration). These were all defined in section 2 of this 
research study. This relationship was further assessed using simple linear 
regression, namely, a general linear model (GLM). 
 
Secondly, the link between executive director profiles and executive director 
remuneration was determined by using the groupings of the director matrix complied 
(see Table 3.2). These profiles were correlated with the individual executive director 
remuneration components as well as the total executive director remuneration.  
 
In order to investigate the second research question as to whether there was either a 
direct or indirect correlation between executive profiles and remuneration, a matrix 
table was compiled by examining the directors per company and then tabulating their 
profiles as per the guidance outlined by KPMG in Malaysia (2009), the Korn/Ferry 
Institute (2012) and the Institute of Directors (2009). Table 3.1 below presents the 
table that was compiled of the data in order to facilitate the data analysis. 
 
Table 3.1: Matrix comparing director profiles 
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Category Guidelines
Age not disclosed
31‐40
41‐50
51‐60
60+
Male
Female
White
Coloured/Indian
Black
Not disclosed/ No degree
Diploma or other
Bcom/BSc/LLB/BA
MBA/CFA/PHD
CA(SA)
1‐5 years
6‐10 years
11‐15 years
16‐20 years
20 years and greater
attended all meetings required
did not attend all meetings
Age
Gender
Race
Educational Qualification
Length of directorship
Meeting Attendance
Table 3.2 Groupings of data collected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 above details the way in which the researcher grouped the data into 
various categories to make it easier to interpret the data when populating it into the 
director profile matrix. For gender, obviously, just two groups were disclosed, that is, 
male or female. Director ages were categorised into five groupings, each with a 
range of 10 years except for those directors whose ages were not disclosed, while 
those above 60 years were all grouped into one group. Race was categorised into 
black or white, while Indians and coloureds were grouped together.  
 
Educational qualification was categorised into five groups; namely, directors with 
either no degree/diploma or else educational qualification not disclosed, directors 
with a diploma or other qualification, directors with a general Bachelor of Commerce 
(BCom), Bachelor of Science (BSc), law degree (LLB) or Bachelor of Arts (BA) 
degree, directors with an MBA, CFA or PhD and those with a CA. The length of 
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directorship or tenure, used interchangeably, was also categorised into five groups, 
with each group spanning five years, namely, 1 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 10 to 15 
years and 16 to 20 years, as well as 21 years and more. Lastly, meeting attendance 
was split into two groups, those who attended all meetings and those who did not 
attend all meetings. 
 
Basic descriptive statistics using chi-squared tests, t-tests and ANOVA tests were 
performed on the data to further test the impact of each specific profile type on 
director remuneration. Using the Mann-Whitney U test and Kruskal Wallis test, the 
existence of specific categories of the profiles were examined in order to understand 
their impact on director remuneration. For example, was the remuneration of 
directors who were female and who were qualified Chartered Accountants (CA) 
greater than those who were not CAs? The above statistical methods have all been 
used in previous studies, including studies conducted by Core et al. (1999) and 
Nelson et al. (2011) and, in accordance with the suggestions of Creswell (2008), 
have proved to be suited to quantitative research. All the above mentioned statistics 
were tested by means of IBM SPSS. 
 
3.8 Validity and reliability  
For the purposes of this study, the researcher focused primarily on measurement 
validity in terms of using different dependent variables and endeavouring to examine 
whether each variable was able to reflect an association with firm performance. The 
internal validity of the study was reflected in the correlation test between the different 
variables, which was carried out in order to examine the relationship between these 
variables. In other words, regression diagnostics, including a test for normality and 
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multicollinearity, were carried out to enhance the internal validity of the general linear 
regression model used in the study.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that the data collected was valid. All the data used 
was extracted from the audited and published annual reports of the companies in 
question. These reports are characterised by a high level of both credibility and 
accountability. Further, the data obtained from the individual financial statements is 
deemed unbiased; hence the researcher did not consider it necessary to interpret 
this data when collecting it. The data collected from both BFA McGregor and the 
individual financial statements was deemed both valid and reliable, as these sources 
have been used in other studies, for example those conducted KPMG in Malaysia 
(2009), the Korn/Ferry Institute (2012) and PWC (2013). 
In view of the fact that the data collected for the purposes of this study was collected 
from audited published annual reports, the researcher was sure this would ensure a 
high level of reliability. The regression model used in the study has been utilised by 
previous researchers and was deemed an established model. In addition, the use of 
the SPSS statistical software package ensured that the processing of the data was 
accurate, controllable and reliable. The research methods used in the study were 
also deemed both valid and reliable, as several writers, including Scholtz and Smit 
(2012), Core et al. (1999) and Nelson et al. (2011), have all used these methods. 
Accordingly, the researcher is convinced of the transparency, relevance and 
reliability of this dissertation. 
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3.9 Assumptions, limitations and delimitations 
3.9.1 Assumptions 
The requisite data was obtained from the BFA McGregor database and the individual 
company websites, as well as the companies’ published annual reports. These 
sources constituted reliable third-party information, which has been used by other 
writers for the purposes of academic research, and they were, thus, assumed 
reliable. It was further assumed that the total number of companies included in the 
sample was sufficient to ensure adequate data on company performance and that 
the companies in question had communicated the information honestly and truthfully. 
False data would have had an unfavourable effect on the study results and would 
have skewed the results of the statistics performed. 
 
3.9.2 Limitations 
The data was limited to that of those JSE companies for which all-financial and non-
financial information was available for all the years in the period under investigation, 
namely, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2014. The company performance variables 
used included only Tobin’s Q, ROA, Revenue and Total Assets while executive 
director remuneration included only basic salary, benefits, bonuses, retention 
bonuses and options as disclosed in the annual reports. The executive director 
profiles included only age, gender, race, educational qualification, tenure and 
meeting attendance as disclosed in the annual report or integrated reports of the 
companies. 
 
3.9.3 Delimitations 
Firstly, this report did not aim to study any company other than those listed on the 
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JSE listed entities. In addition, the report focused only on the Code of Governance 
Principles for South Africa 2009 and, thus, data on budgets and forecasts of specific 
business units was not included. Secondly, the report did not aim to investigate the 
remuneration packages of any other directors besides executive directors. Finally, 
the report examined only those benefits as disclosed in the remuneration report and 
did not investigate any long-term benefits, post-employment benefits terminations 
and share based payments as disclosed in the financial statement notes. 
 
3.10 Summary 
The objective of this research study was to establish whether executive director 
remuneration was related to company performance. Thus, using statistical 
techniques, the aim of the study was to explain or predict a dependent variable 
(executive director remuneration) based on a set of independent variables (company 
performance). General linear regression analysis was selected for this purpose. 
Regression results provide information on the statistical significance of the 
independent variables and the strength of the association between one and more of 
the predictors. The information provided by the regression analysis clearly enabled 
the researcher to realise the aims and objectives of this research study. The next 
chapter discusses the results of the general linear regression models used in the 
study. This is followed by a summary of the research study and the conclusions 
drawn from the study. 
  
50 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Analysis and Interpretation of Research Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis and interpretation of the research results. The 
chapter starts by providing details of the sample used, as well as the data screening 
and data transformation that took place. This is followed by a discussion of the 
descriptive statistics used for the primary independent variables. The regression 
models, which were used to analyse the relationship between executive director 
remuneration and company performance, are discussed in section 4.4 of the 
chapter. The regression model was tested at a 5% confidence level.  
 
The latter part of the chapter analyses the inferential statistics, mainly the Mann-
Whitney U tests and Kruskal Wallis tests, which were performed to investigate the 
relationship (if any) between executive director remuneration and executive director 
profiles. The chapter then concludes with section 4.6, which presents and discusses 
a summary of the research results. 
 
4.2 Data 
The combined list of companies listed on the JSE during 2014 – 352 companies was 
extracted from McGregor BFA. Certain companies were removed from the 
population as part of the data screening and data transformation procedures as 
detailed in section 3.2.3. A total of 303 companies were excluded for the following 
reasons, firstly, their information was not available as a result of the shares being 
either delisted or suspended on the JSE, secondly, they did not disclose the key 
variable staff costs or a variable in relation to the composition of the board of 
51 
 
directors and, finally, they did not disclose information pertaining to all five of the 
financial years investigated. As a result, the final sample comprised 49 companies*. 
The final director dataset contained 708 records, each referring to a year (from 2010 
to 2014) and, for each year, all the directors of the companies in question. 
*352–303 = 49 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
4.3.1 Univariate descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Director year’s distribution 
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the director profile data records were distributed across five 
years. The groups per year were not independent as a given director could have 
been involved in more than one year. The unit of analysis was director-years, 
irrespective of individual directors. It is important to bear in mind that not all individual 
directors contributed the same number of years and, thus, all the relevant attributes 
were in favour of those of directors who had contributed to the most director-years. 
The director-years were effectively equally distributed across the five years. 
 
While none of the King reports stipulates a maximum size required for a board 
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(Armstrong et al., 2005, IOD, 2009), the IOD (2009) insists that, in terms of King III, a 
board should comprise at least two directors, namely, the CEO and the finance 
director, while the Companies Act of 2008 requires that the board of a public 
company should consist of at least three directors. The director matrix table complied 
from the data collected revealed that, for all the companies in the sample, there had 
been at least three directors in every year. This implies that the requirements of both 
the Companies Act and the King III report were being met.  
 
Table 4.1: Age distribution  
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 4.1, on average, the directors were 49.28 years old for all the 
director-years with a small variation (coefficient of variation = 0.155) from one 
director-year to the next. 
 
Table 4.2: Age group distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 4.2, the ages of 4.2% of the total population of directors were 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Age 678 31 73 49.28 7.715 
Valid N 
(listwise) 678         
  Frequency Percentage Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Valid 
60+ 43 6.1 6.3 6.3 
51-60 251 35.5 37 43.4 
41-50 279 39.4 41.2 84.5 
31-40 105 14.8 15.5 100 
Total 678 95.8 100   
Missing Age not disclosed 30 4.2     
Total 708 100     
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not disclosed in the financial statements examined. It may, however, be noted that, 
among those who disclosed their age every year, the majority (75%) of the directors 
across the director-years were between 41 and 60 years of age. It was also 
observed that very few directors (6.1%) above the age of 60 remained in executive 
positions. This was probably to be expected as the retirement age in South Africa 
ranges from 60 years for females to 65 years for males (The South African Labour 
Guide, 2016). The table also shows that 14.8% of directors were aged between 31 
and 40. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Gender and race distribution 
 
As illustrated In Figure 4.2, the vast majority of directors across the five director-
years tended to be male (91%) rather than female (9%). In addition, the majority of 
directors across all the years were primarily white (85%), with less than 20% of the 
directors being black, Indian or coloured. Both the gender and the race results 
statistics were surprising, as the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 specifically 
prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds of, among others, race, gender and 
age. The aim of this Act is to ensure employment equity. 
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Figure 4.3: Qualification and tenure distribution 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates that, in 10.3% of the director-years, the directors either did not 
disclose their education levels or else they did not have degrees. However, in more 
than half (51.3%) of the director-years, the directors had a CA (SA) qualification 
while almost 30% of the directors held a general BCom, LLB, BA or BSc degree. 
Approximately 9% of directors held an MBA, PHD, CFA or a diploma. In terms of 
tenure distribution, the majority of the directors (46.9%) had served a period of 
between one and five years as executive director, while a large percentage of 
directors (42.2%) had remained on the executive director board for a period of 
between 6 and 15 years. In addition, the results revealed that 10.9% of directors had 
held executive positions for longer than 15 years. The results collected in the director 
profile matrix showed that, for all the director-years, the directors had attended all 
meetings that they were required to attend. Accordingly, no additional statistics were 
conducted on meeting attendance. 
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Table 4.3: Remuneration distribution 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation CV 
Basic 
Salary 708 0 15303000 2570111 1697410 0.66 
Benefits 708 0 56724000 687230 2455689 3.57 
Bonuses 708 0 30616000 1711096 2470612 1.44 
Retention 708 0 3127000 66038 345352 5.23 
Options 708 0 52954000 849787 3228832 3.80 
Total 708 0 68636000 5884261 6319521 1.07 
Valid N 
(listwise) 708           
 
The table above shows that, on average, the basic salary of directors per director-
year was R2 570 111. Despite the fact that there were significant variations in basic 
salary between the director-years, this item demonstrated the highest level of 
agreement across the director-years (CV = 0.660). All the other items on the list 
varied extensively with retention displaying the highest variation (CV = 5.230). This 
was, however, to be expected because, as noted from the data collected, not all the 
companies paid a retention bonus. It was also noted that not all the companies had 
options that were disclosed at face value and, thus, a significant variation was noted 
in this category (CV = 3.8). Benefits included items such as travel or car allowances, 
medical aid allowances, etc. These also differed from company to company although 
this category displayed a marginal variation only (CV = 3.573). 
 
Table 4.4: Company performance variables distribution 
   N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  CV 
Revenue_2010  49  53438000  122256000000  11388629714  22586637728  1.9833 
Revenue_2011  49  55608000  1113110000000  34775820303  159181232616  4.5774 
Revenue_2012  49  47382983  1258694000000  39497858835  180057699409  4.5587 
Revenue_2013  49  92382000  169891000000  15335592736  31336992324  2.0434 
Revenue_2014  49  103567000  202683000000  16687698234  34648720075  2.0763 
Valid N (listwise)  49                
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   N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  CV 
TobinsQ_2010  49  0.1  1.2  0.537  0.2249  2.3297 
TobinsQ_2011  49  0.1  1  0.524  0.2106  3.0728 
TobinsQ_2012  49  0  1  0.518  0.2039  3.201 
TobinsQ_2013  49  0.1  6.1  0.615  0.8226  3.4485 
TobinsQ_2014  49  0.1  5.3  0.594  0.7129  3.3818 
Valid N (listwise)  49                
   N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  CV 
ROA_2010  49  ‐15.01  81.49  13.6922  15.90071  2.3297 
ROA_2011  49  ‐33.48  74.73  11.1294  15.58976  3.0728 
ROA_2012  49  ‐26.99  78.42  10.168  14.45553  3.201 
ROA_2013  49  ‐35.11  65.61  7.8288  15.6237  3.4485 
ROA_2014  49  ‐20.66  68.76  8.6355  13.98694  3.3818 
Valid N (listwise)  49                
   N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  CV 
TotalAssets_2010  49  34223000  156484000000  10181598368  23720013669  2.3297 
TotalAssets_2011  49  36533000  341823000000  17644067786  54217516626  3.0728 
TotalAssets_2012  49  45698000  396986000000  19470781693  62326008086  3.201 
TotalAssets_2013  49  51716000  561304000000  24963007746  86086095506  3.4485 
TotalAssets_2014  49  59021000  611253000000  27910495175  94387542931  3.3818 
Valid N (listwise) 49           
 
Table 4.4 above presents the descriptive statistics pertaining to the company 
performance data that was examined. The table shows the mean amounts for all the 
variables examined, namely, revenue, total assets, Tobin’s Q and ROA. It may be 
noted that there were significant degrees of variation across the years for all four of 
the variables.  
 
The highest variation in revenue was during 2012, while the CVs had started to 
stabilise during 2013 and 2014. The 2010 revenue amounts depicted the lowest 
variation (CV = 1.9833). The results revealed that the CVs for total assets, Tobin’s Q 
and ROA were identical for all the years examined and were also fairly consistent 
across the periods with the highest variation during 2013 (CV = 3.4485) and the 
lowest during 2010 (CV = 2.3297). 
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4.3.2 Tests of normality and correlation tests 
The data interpreted above may be viewed in two different ways. Firstly, the data 
may be interpreted by allowing one company to contribute more records to the 
sample based on the number of directors in the company. This means that the unit of 
analysis would be director-years, thus giving a sample of 708 records covering five 
years.  
 
Secondly, the data may be interpreted by aggregating the remuneration variables so 
that each company contributes a single remuneration record with each remuneration 
variable being the average director remuneration calculated for each of the five 
years. This means that the unit of analysis would be company-years, thus giving a 
sample of 245 records covering five years. It was decided to choose the first option 
as a preferred method as this method takes into account the data on director profiles 
and company performance that occurred over a five-year period. The differing 
number of directors per company per year is presented in the table below. 
Table 4.5: Number of director’s year cross tabulation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Count   Year Total 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
NumDirectors 
1 3 1 1 0 1 6 
2 17 19 21 23 24 104 
3 18 16 14 15 16 79 
4 7 8 7 7 5 34 
5 2 3 4 3 3 15 
6 1 1 1 0 0 3 
7 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Total 49 49 49 49 49 245 
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Table 4.6: Tests of normality 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Revenue .414 708 .000 .182 708 .000
Total Assets .387 708 .000 .280 708 .000
TobinsQ .225 708 .000 .407 708 .000
ROA .152 708 .000 .846 708 .000
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Basic Salary .120 708 .000 .863 708 .000
Benefits .390 708 .000 .173 708 .000
Bonuses .244 708 .000 .655 708 .000
Retention .522 708 .000 .193 708 .000
Options .396 708 .000 .274 708 .000
Total .190 708 .000 .644 708 .000
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests tested the null hypothesis 
that the data is normally distributed. Both tests revealed that the data deviated 
significantly from normal deviation (p (Sig) < .05). Thus, non-parametric methods 
should be used in conjunction with these variables. The deviation from normality is 
illustrated in the Appendix A and Appendix B. It was noted that there were some far 
outliers in the data. 
 
When running correlation tests, both Spearman’s (non-parametric) and Pearson’s 
(parametric) correlations were tested. However, the significance of Pearson’s 
correlation was not interpreted in view of the non-normal distributions. As illustrated 
in the table below, there were no significant correlations noted from the statistical 
tests performed, although correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) and 
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the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.7: Correlation tests 
Correlations 
 Basic Salary Benefits Bonuses Retention Options Total 
Spearman
's rho 
Basic Salary Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .   
N 708   
Benefits Correlation 
Coefficient .434** 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .   
N 708 708   
Bonuses Correlation 
Coefficient .525** .268** 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .   
N 708 708 708   
Retention Correlation 
Coefficient -.050 -.002 -.085* 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .188 .963 .023 .   
N 708 708 708 708   
Options Correlation 
Coefficient .180** .231** .162** -.084* 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .025 .  
N 708 708 708 708 708  
Total Correlation 
Coefficient .865** .547** .722** .001 .385** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .980 .000 . 
N 708 708 708 708 708 708 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 Revenue Total Assets TobinsQ ROA 
Spearman's rho Revenue Correlation Coefficient 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .  
N 708  
Total Assets Correlation Coefficient .863** 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .  
N 708 708  
TobinsQ Correlation Coefficient -.135** -.180** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . 
N 708 708 708 
ROA Correlation Coefficient .068 .058 .052 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .069 .121 .167 .
N 708 708 708 708
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations 
 Revenue Total Assets TobinsQ ROA 
Spearman's rho Basic Salary Correlation 
Coefficient .429** .428** -.229** .024 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .526 
N 708 708 708 708 
Benefits Correlation 
Coefficient .318** .249** -.015 -.061 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .686 .106 
N 708 708 708 708 
Bonuses Correlation 
Coefficient .176** .265** -.196** .028 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .455 
N 708 708 708 708 
Retention Correlation 
Coefficient .022 -.077* -.109** -.158** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .561 .042 .004 .000 
N 708 708 708 708 
Options Correlation 
Coefficient .119** .141** .004 .065 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .913 .085 
N 708 708 708 708 
Total Correlation 
Coefficient .454** .469** -.239** .008 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .834 
N 708 708 708 708 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The most significant correlations for the company performance variables was 
between total assets and revenue while Tobin’s Q and revenue and total assets 
showed a negative correlation. For the director remuneration variables, the most 
significant correlation was between benefits and basic salary as well as between 
bonuses and basic salary. The study also found a significant correlation between 
total remuneration and all the other director remuneration variables except for 
retention.  
 
With regard to the company performance variables versus the director remuneration 
variables, the study found a strong correlation between basic salary and revenue as 
well as between total assets and benefits and revenue. There was also a significant 
correlation between total remuneration and both revenue and total assets. In 
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Female Male
Count 12 130 142
% within 
Gender 18.80% 20.20% 20.10%
Count 13 134 147
% within 
Gender 20.30% 20.80% 20.80%
Count 13 133 146
% within 
Gender 20.30% 20.70% 20.60%
Count 13 128 141
% within 
Gender 20.30% 19.90% 19.90%
Count 13 119 132
% within 
Gender 20.30% 18.50% 18.60%
Count 64 644 708
% within 
Gender 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Year * Gender  Crosstabulation
Gender Total
Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total
addition, the study found a linear relationship between the performance variables 
and the remuneration variables. The graphs in Appendix C illustrate this relationship. 
 
4.3.3 Bivariate descriptive statistics 
Figure 4.4: Bivariate statistics on the director profile components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
In summary, the above bivariate statistics depicted in Figure 4.4 for director profile 
components revealed the following: firstly, the male–female distribution remained 
essentially the same across the five data collection years. Secondly, there was no 
discernible pattern in the proportions of 41 to 55 year olds and 51 to 60 year olds. 
However, across the five years, the proportions of 60 years and older directors 
increased, while the proportions of 31 to 40 year olds decreased. However, this 
pattern was to be expected because many of the same directors were involved in 
more than one year and they obviously age every year. As was to be expected, the 
mean age increased slightly across the years.  
 
Thirdly, there was relatively little variation in the race proportions across the five 
years. Fourthly, proportion of directors with a CA (SA) qualification demonstrated a 
downward trend across the five years. However, this variation was to also be 
expected because of the fact that the same directors were involved in more than one 
year. Fifthly, the average remuneration amounts, except for retention, all increased 
across the five years. Sixthly, the study showed that the 60+ year old group 
consisted of males only. In addition, males comprised the largest proportion in all 
age groups as compared to females and dominated in all race groups. None of the 
directors with a diploma or an undisclosed education level was female, whiles all the 
directors with tenure of 16 years or longer was male.  
 
Finally, none of the black directors was older than 60. However, this was to be 
expected as the Employment Equity Act, 1998, which prevents the unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of, among others, race, gender and age was only 
passed in 1998 and, thus, blacks were awarded top positions only on implementation 
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of the Act. In addition, the older directors tended not to have degrees. All the 
directors who had tenure of 20 years or more were white. Whites also predominated 
in all the educational qualification groups. 
 
Table 4.8: Bivariate statistics on the company performance components 
 
Race Revenue Total Assets Tobin’s Q ROA 
Black 29270449813.151 64628354009.226 .767 10.7891
Coloured/Indian 34919092877.551 67929366673.469 .492 11.8594
White 26949151081.035 15088118412.267 .534 10.1290
Total 27674512635.881 22453730914.298 .549 10.2981
 
Educational qualification Revenue Total Assets Tobin’s Q ROA 
CA(SA) 18047675505.614 15506685472.705 .530 10.2760
MBA/CFA/PHD 31986274548.387 133477521774.194 .433 2.1765
BCom/BSc/LLB/BA 29978764078.986 26535706790.194 .540 9.1661
Diploma or other 164753088966.667 5397961400.000 .885 13.4047
Not disclosed/ No degree 10720032013.699 5062171383.562 .581 15.8526
Total 27674512635.881 22453730914.298 .549 10.2981
 
Table 4.8 above presents the company performance statistics. In short, the results 
showed the following: On average revenue tended to be more in the director-years, 
Gender Revenue Total Assets Tobin’s Q ROA 
Female 37260392472.266 66683238384.813 .554 5.4705
Male 26721878614.874 18058251911.017 .548 10.7779
Total 27674512635.881 22453730914.298 .549 10.2981
Length of directorship Revenue Total Assets Tobin’s Q ROA 
20 years and greater 5030332812.500 3460173062.500 .570 9.7319
16–20 years 8966146244.444 4730181644.444 .559 9.2984
11–15 years 44835377178.395 23913588068.009 .508 9.5576
6–10 years 28921352257.942 25177148695.768 .479 9.9171
1–5 years 26045164679.970 24648850673.837 .599 10.9494
Total 27674512635.881 22453730914.298 .549 10.2981
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Revenue TotalAssets TobinsQ ROA
Statistic 27674512636 22453730914 0.55 10.30
Std. Error 4794081940 2937969880 0.02 0.54
Lower 
Bound Statistic 18262171503 16685541072 0.52 9.23
Upper 
Bound Statistic 37086853769 28221920756 0.58 11.36
Statistic 10303815322 7566350851 0.52 9.98
Statistic 3542368500 3605856000 0.51 10.76
Statistic 16272120926719800000000 6111220247515130000000 0.20 208.08
Statistic 127562223745 78174294033 0.44 14.43
Statistic 47382983 34223000 0.00 -35.11
Statistic 1258694000000 611253000000 6.10 81.49
Statistic 1258646617017 611218777000 6.10 116.60
Statistic 9698926000 10370732000 0.20 10.00
Statistic 9 6 9.23 0.99
Std. Error 0 0 0.09 0.09
Statistic 76 34 107.48 6.93
Std. Error 0 0 0.18 0.18
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
which were characterised by younger directors, while, on average, total assets were 
more during director-years which were dominated by 51 to 60 year old directors. It 
did not appear that Tobin’s Q was influenced by the age of the directors. However, 
ROA seemed to be higher for director-years characterised by either older or younger 
directors. On average, revenue was higher in director-years characterised by female 
directors. 
 
4.4 Regression analysis 
4.4.1 Testing assumptions 
The following dependent and independent variables were used for the regression 
analysis: 
 DV = each of the remuneration variables in turn 
 IV = Tobin’s Q, ROA, Revenue and Total Assets 
 
4.4.2 Univariate data exploration: independent variables (IV) and dependent 
variables (DV) 
Table 4.9: Company performance variables regression statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Graph depicting the distribution of the company performance 
variable  
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Basic Salary Benefits Bonuses Retention Options Total
Statistic 2570111 687230 1711096 66038 849787 5884261
Std. Error 63793 92290 92851 12979 121347 237502
Lower 
Bound Statistic 2444866 506034 1528799 40555 611543 5417967
Upper 
Bound Statistic 2695357 868426 1893393 91520 1088030 6350555
Statistic 2412613 425748 1394290 673 337642 5105850
Statistic 2164000 326500 845000 0 0 4274500
Statistic 2881200441001 6030408350799 6103924871646 119267730110 10425355936061 39936350253601
Statistic 1697410 2455689 2470612 345352 3228832 6319521
Statistic 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistic 15303000 56724000 30616000 3127000 52954000 68636000
Statistic 15303000 56724000 30616000 3127000 52954000 68636000
Statistic 1910750 549500 2211250 0 46250 4963500
Statistic 2 18 4 6 9 4
Std. Error 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistic 7 390 35 42 112 32
Std. Error 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Range
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Basic Salary 0.12 708 0 0.863 708 0
Benefits 0.39 708 0 0.173 708 0
Bonuses 0.244 708 0 0.655 708 0
Retention 0.522 708 0 0.193 708 0
Options 0 396 708 0 0 274 708 0
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10: Director remuneration regression statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Tables 4.9 and 4.10, as well as in Figure 4.5 above, revenue, total 
assets and Tobin’s Q were highly positively skewed and leptokurtic while the 
distribution of ROA bore a close resemblance to the normal distribution. All the DVs 
demonstrated positive skewness and kurtosis and were similar to the distribution of 
the IVs. 
 
Table 4.11: Additional regression statistics 
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Revenue TotalAssets TobinsQ ROA
Correlation Coefficient 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .863** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 .
N 708 708
Correlation Coefficient -.135** -.180** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 .
Correlations
Spearman's 
rho
Revenue
TotalAssets
TobinsQ
TobinsQ
Correlation Coefficient -.229**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient -0.015
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.686
N 708
Correlation Coefficient -.196**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient -.109**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004
N 708
Correlation Coefficient 0.004
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.913
N 708
Correlation Coefficient -.239**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlations
Spearman's 
rho
Basic Salary
Benefits
Bonuses
Retention
Options
Total
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
ROA
Correlation Coefficient 0.024
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.526
N 708
Correlation Coefficient -0.061
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.106
N 708
Correlation Coefficient 0.028
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.455
N 708
Correlation Coefficient -.158**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient 0.065
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.085
N 708
Correlation Coefficient 0.008
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.834
N 708
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
Spearman's 
rho
Basic Salary
Benefits
Bonuses
Retention
Options
Total
Revenue
Correlation Coefficient .429**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .318**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .176**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient 0.022
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.561
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .119**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .454**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
Spearman's 
rho
Basic Salary
Benefits
Bonuses
Retention
Options
Total
TotalAssets
Correlation Coefficient .428**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .249**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .265**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient -.077*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.042
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .141**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .469**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 708
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
Spearman's 
rho
Basic Salary
Benefits
Bonuses
Retention
Options
Total
 
 
 
 
 
As seen in Table 4.11 above, all the DVs deviated significantly from the norm. 
However, normality of the DV was not a required assumption and it was important 
only to note that the residuals were normally distributed. 
 
Table 4.12: Correlations: director remuneration variables versus company 
performance variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.13: Correlations: director remuneration variables  
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Revenue TotalAssets TobinsQ ROA
Correlation Coefficient 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .
N 708
Correlation Coefficient .863** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 .
N 708 708
Correlations
Spearman's
Revenue
TotalAssets
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above tables, 4.12 and 4.13, showed that Tobin’s Q was not correlated with any 
of the remuneration variables. Accordingly, Tobin’s Q was not expected to contribute 
significantly to predicting any of the remuneration variables. In addition, ROA was 
not correlated with any of the remuneration variables and therefore it was not 
expected to contribute significantly to predicting any of the remuneration variables. 
These findings were contrary to the results of a study performed by De Wet (2012) 
as De Wet found a strong relationship between executive remuneration and ROA. 
This is a more traditional performance measure when examining JSE listed 
companies. 
 
The study found a positive correlation between basic salary and revenue, between 
benefits and revenue as well as between total remuneration and revenue. Thus, it 
was expected to contribute to predicting basic salary and benefits. There was a 
positive correlation between basic salary and total assets as well as between total 
remuneration and total assets and thus this was expected to contribute to predicting 
basic salary and total remuneration.  
 
Table 4.14: Correlations: relationship between the company performance 
variables  
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Model R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
1 .228a 0.052 0.047 1657437.504
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 105798058578320 4 26449514644580 9.628 .000b
Residual 1931210653209420 703 2747099079957
Total 2037008711787740 707
1
a. Dependent Variable: Basic Salary
b. Predictors: (Constant), ROA, Revenue, TobinsQ, TotalAssets
Model
Model Summaryb
a. Predictors: (Constant), ROA, Revenue, TobinsQ, TotalAssets
b. Dependent Variable: Basic Salary
ANOVAa
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound
Upper 
Bound
(Constant) 2416426 111590.38 21.654 0 2197335 2635516
Revenue 0 0 0.015 0.407 0.684 0 0
TotalAssets 0 0 0.22 5.898 0 0 0
TobinsQ 163375 142401.194 0.042 1.147 0.252 -116208 442957.6
ROA -4747 4336.49 -0.04 -1.095 0.274 -13261.3 3766.744
1
a. Dependent Variable: Basic Salary
Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.14 illustrates that only revenue and total assets were correlated and that the 
correlation was strong enough to merit an investigation into problems with 
multicollinearity. This finding was in line with the results of research conducted by 
Scholtz and Smit (2012), who found a strong relationship between total assets and 
executive remuneration. However, the findings of this study were also contrary to the 
findings of their study as they also found a strong relationship between executive 
remuneration and turnover. 
 
Table 4.15: Regression analysis  
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As was evident in Table 4.15 above, when all the IVs were used to predict basic 
salary in a regression analysis, the results showed that only one of the IVs 
contributed significantly to the model (see Table 4.15 above). The model explains 
approximately 5% only of the variance. In addition, when basic salary was used as a 
DV the coefficient of at least one IV differed significantly from zero. As noted, only 
total assets made a significant contribution to the solution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Graph depicting the regression of total assets only 
 
Performing the regression with total assets only as IV resulted in the following output 
(see Figure 4.6 above). The residuals did not deviate significantly from the norm. 
However, when ‘benefits’ was changed to be the dependent variable approximately 
1% only of the variance was explained by the model and, thus, the model was only 
marginally significant. Accordingly, only total assets make a significant contribution to 
the solution.  
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When bonuses were used as a DV, ‘total assets’ was once again the only significant 
predictor. Using retention, options and total remuneration as dependent variables did 
not provide viable models, as this explained approximately 4% only of the variation 
for retention while the 5% for total remunerations was not significant. Thus, the 
options model was not at all significant.  
 
Using the GLM, which represents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) method, the set 
of IVs was linked to the set of DVs in order to identify possible relationships. The 
results of the individual regression analyses are illustrated in the GLM in Appendix D. 
The summary in Table 4.16 below clearly shows that total assets only was 
significantly related to director remuneration. 
 
Table 4.16: Summary of the GLM  
  
Remuneration variables (DVs) 
Basic Salary  Benefits Bonuses Retention Options  Total
Performance 
Variables 
(IVs) 
Revenue  x  x  x  x 
Model not 
significant 
x 
Total 
Assets      
Tobin's Q  x  x  x  x  x 
ROA  x  x  x  a  x 
 
 
4.5 Inferential tests 
In view of the non-normality of the numeric variables, non-parametric methods were 
used to investigate the sub-research questions. Meeting attendance was not 
included in the inferential tests as the director matrix complied had revealed that all 
the directors had attended all the relevant meetings held and, thus, no comparison 
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would have been possible as it would have been if there had been directors who had 
not attended all the meetings.  
 
4.5.1 Gender and remuneration 
In order to determine whether gender had an effect on the remuneration variables, a 
Mann-Whitney U test was conducted with gender as the independent variable and 
the various remuneration variables as the dependent variables.  
 
Table 4.17: Inferential tests: gender and remuneration 
Test Statisticsa
  Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Basic Salary 14435 16515 -3.956 0
Benefits 16928.5 19008.5 -2.36 0.018
Bonuses 19225.5 21305.5 -0.888 0.374
Retention 20083.5 227773.5 -0.861 0.389
Options 19779.5 21859.5 -0.695 0.487
Total 16145.5 18225.5 -2.86 0.004
a. Grouping Variable: Gender 
 
 
Ranks
  Gender Female Male Total 
Basic Salary 
N 64 644 708
Mean 
Rank 258.05 364.09   
Sum of 
Ranks 16515 234471   
Benefits 
N 64 644 708
Mean 
Rank 297.01 360.21   
Sum of 
Ranks 19008.5 231977.5   
Bonuses 
N 64 644 708
Mean 
Rank 332.9 356.65   
Sum of 
Ranks 21305.5 229680.5   
Retention 
N 64 644 708
Mean 
Rank 362.7 353.69   
Sum of 
Ranks 23212.5 227773.5   
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Options 
N 64 644 708
Mean 
Rank 341.55 355.79   
Sum of 
Ranks 21859.5 229126.5   
Total 
N 64 644 708
Mean 
Rank 284.77 361.43   
Sum of 
Ranks 18225.5 232760.5   
 
As shown in Table 4.17 above, the Mann-Whitney U test revealed that there was a 
significant mean rank difference in the following:  
 Basic salary (z = -3.956, p < .01) between males (n = 644 < MR = 364.09) and 
females (n = 64, MR = 258.05), with males tending, on average, to be 
associated with a larger basic salary than females. 
 Benefits (z = -2.360, p < .05) between males (n = 644 < MR = 360.21) and 
females (n = 64, MR = 297.01), with males tending, on average, to be 
associated with more benefits than females. 
 Total (z = -2.860, p < .01) between males (n = 644 < MR = 361.43) and 
females (n = 64, MR = 284.77) with males tending, on average, to be 
associated with higher total remuneration than females (to be expected based 
on the previous two results). 
 
4.5.2 Age and remuneration 
In order to determine whether age had an effect on the remuneration variables, a 
Kruskal Wallis test was conducted with age as the independent variable and the 
various remuneration variables as the dependent variables. 
Table 4.18: Inferential tests: age and remuneration 
Ranks 
Age 
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60+ 51-60 41-50 31-40 Total 
Basic Salary N 43 251 279 105 678 
Mean Rank 366.60 380.66 338.16 233.58  
Benefits N 43 251 279 105 678 
Mean Rank 418.01 387.17 337.00 200.04  
Bonuses N 43 251 279 105 678 
Mean Rank 366.34 380.24 339.46 231.22  
Retention N 43 251 279 105 678 
Mean Rank 328.93 341.70 333.06 355.69  
Options N 43 251 279 105 678 
Mean Rank 355.47 347.88 348.99 287.70  
Total N 43 251 279 105 678 
Mean Rank 362.79 382.52 345.79 210.40  
 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 Basic Salary Benefits Bonuses Retention Options Total 
Chi-Square 42.626 75.148 43.941 7.586 14.540 58.622 
df 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .000 .055 .002 .000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Age 
 
As depicted in Table 4.18 above, the Kruskal Wallis test revealed that there were 
significant mean rank differences in all the remuneration variables with the exception 
of retention. 
 
Table 4.19: Inferential tests: age and remuneration additional testing 
 
 
 
 
 
 Age 60+ 51-60 41-50 31-40 
Basic Salary 2724023.3a,b,c 2980621.5a 2499390.5b 1947147.8c 
Benefits 893883.7a 931677.3a 649674.0a 247595.5a 
Bonuses 2417302.3a 2143426.3a 1697381.8a 810565.6b 
Options 1109093.0a 832091.6a 1101283.2a 360428.6a 
Total 7168348.8a 6996645.4a 5984862.2a 3439972.3b 
Note: Values in the same row and sub table not sharing the same subscript are 
significantly different at p< .05 in the two-sided test of equality for column means. 
Cells with no subscript are not included in the test. Tests assume equal 
variances.1 
1. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost 
sub table using the Bonferroni correction. 
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As indicated in Table 4.19 above, the IBM SPSS Statistics Custom Tables Module (t-
tests with Bonferroni correction) was used as a post-hoc test to determine the 
specific age group pairs that differed significantly on average. 
 31 to 40 year old directors tended to receive smaller bonuses and total 
remuneration compared to directors who were 60 years or older. 
 31 to 40 year old directors tended to receive smaller basic salaries, bonuses 
and total remuneration compared to directors who were 51 to 60 years old. 
 31 to 40 year old directors tended to receive smaller basic salaries, bonuses 
and total remuneration compared to directors who were 41 to 50 years old. 
 41 to 50 year old directors tended to receive smaller basic salaries as 
compared to directors who were 51 to 60 years old. 
 No pairwise differences were identified with regard to benefits and options, 
possibly as a result of the Bonferroni correction as well as their highly skewed 
distributions. 
 
4.5.3 Race and remuneration 
Table 4.20: Inferential tests: race and remuneration  
Ranks
  Race Black Coloured/Indian White Total 
Basic Salary 
N 53 49 606 708 
Mean 
Rank 300.21 328.96 361.31   
Benefits 
N 53 49 606 708 
Mean 
Rank 411.68 385.74 346.97   
Bonuses 
N 53 49 606 708 
Mean 
Rank 387.29 399.49 347.99   
Retention 
N 53 49 606 708 
Mean 
Rank 400.47 335.5 352.02   
Options 
N 53 49 606 708 
Mean 
Rank 329.27 369.09 355.53   
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Total 
N 53 49 606 708 
Mean 
Rank 340.1 362.82 355.09   
          
 
Test Statistics a,b 
  Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
Basic Salary 5.171 2 0.075 
Benefits 6.118 2 0.047 
Bonuses 4.369 2 0.113 
Retention 20.914 2 0 
Options 1.837 2 0.399 
Total 0.349 2 0.84 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test    b. Grouping Variable: Race 
 
As indicated in Table 4.20 above, the Kruskal Wallis test revealed that there was a 
significant mean rank difference in retention and benefits (only marginally) among 
the race groups. However, bearing in mind that 95% of the director-years had a 
value of zero (highly skewed distribution); this result should not be interpreted 
further.  
 
Table 4.21: Inferential tests: race and remuneration additional testing 
 
As shown in Table 4.21 above, the IBM SPSS Statistics Custom Tables Module (t-
tests with Bonferroni correction) was used as a post-hoc test to determine the 
specific race group pairs that differed significantly on average. However, no 
significant pairs were identified, possibly as a result of the Bonferroni correction. 
 Race Black Coloured/Indian White 
Benefits 836493.5a 729073.6a 670791.8a
 
Note: Values in the same row and sub table not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p< .05 in 
the two-sided test of equality for column means. Cells with no subscript are not included in the test. Tests assume 
equal variances.1 
1. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost sub table using the Bonferroni 
correction. 
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4.5.4 Education and remuneration 
Table 4.22: Inferential tests: education and remuneration  
Ranks 
 
Educational qualification 
CA(SA) 
MBA/CFA/PH
D 
Bcom/BSc/LL
B/BA 
Diploma or 
other 
Not 
disclosed/ No 
degree Total 
Basic 
Salary 
N 363 31 211 30 73 708
Mean Rank 329.19 445.74 381.05 314.45 381.34  
Benefits N 363 31 211 30 73 708
Mean Rank 322.37 473.90 364.52 367.78 429.12  
Bonuses N 363 31 211 30 73 708
Mean Rank 340.33 417.11 383.84 231.37 364.19  
Retention N 363 31 211 30 73 708
Mean Rank 353.05 358.21 360.48 372.35 335.50  
Options N 363 31 211 30 73 708
Mean Rank 353.79 390.32 351.44 289.87 378.24  
Total N 363 31 211 30 73 708
Mean Rank 328.56 457.27 382.09 255.58 400.73  
 
 
As illustrated in Table 4.22 above, the Kruskal Wallis test revealed that there were 
significant mean rank differences between the various educational level groups as 
regards basic salary, benefits and bonuses and, thus total remuneration. 
 
Table 4.23: Inferential tests: education and remuneration additional testing 
 
Educational qualification 
CA(SA) MBA/CFA/PHD 
Bcom/BSc/LLB/
BA Diploma or other 
Not disclosed/ 
No degree 
Basic Salary 2332558.7a 3243903.2b 2854991.1b 2335333.3a,b 2738301.4a,b
Benefits 615689.4a 616612.9a 761314.3a 408800.0a 973246.6a
Bonuses 1433834.5a,c 1967419.4a,b 2148696.7b 563766.7a 2187616.4b,c
Total 5102995.5a 6896096.8a,b 7080510.4b 3827966.7a,b 6726904.1a,b
Note: Values in the same row and sub table not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p< 
.05 in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Cells with no subscript are not included in the test. 
Tests assume equal variances.1 
1. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost sub table using the 
Bonferroni correction. 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 Basic Salary Benefits Bonuses Retention Options Total 
Chi-Square 17.694 29.926 20.130 6.999 8.547 28.251
df 4 4 4 4 4 4
Asymp. Sig. .001 .000 .000 .136 .073 .000
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Educational qualification 
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As shown in Table 4.23 above, the IBM SPSS Statistics Custom Tables Module (t-
tests with Bonferroni correction) was used as a post-hoc test to determine the 
specific age group pairs that differed significantly on average. It was found that: 
 The CA (SA) educational group tended to receive lower basic salaries as 
compared to the MBA/CFA/PHD and BCom/BSc/LLB/BA groups. 
 The CA (SA) educational group also tended to receive lower bonuses and 
total remuneration compared to the BCom/BSc/LLB/BA group. 
 The diploma or other educational group tended to receive lower bonuses as 
compared to both the BCom/BSc/LLB/BA and the non-disclosed education 
groups. 
 No pairwise differences were identified with regard to benefits, because of 
both the highly skewed distribution and the Bonferroni correction. 
 
4.5.4 Tenure and remuneration 
Table 4.24: Inferential tests: tenure and remuneration  
 
 
Length of directorship 
20 years and 
greater 16-20 years 11-15 years 6-10 years 1-5 years Total 
Basic Salary N 32 45 109 190 332 708
Mean Rank 394.08 407.54 391.99 391.66 309.92  
Benefits N 32 45 109 190 332 708
Mean Rank 316.05 364.29 382.55 349.83 350.34  
Bonuses N 32 45 109 190 332 708
Mean Rank 235.67 357.24 350.12 390.06 346.67  
Retention N 32 45 109 190 332 708
Mean Rank 335.50 343.02 344.94 358.04 359.00  
Options N 32 45 109 190 332 708
Mean Rank 314.25 318.67 344.06 360.12 363.44  
Total N 32 45 109 190 332 708
Mean Rank 299.41 379.82 374.37 396.93 325.57  
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Test Statisticsa,b 
 Basic Salary Benefits Bonuses Retention Options Total 
Chi-Square 29.933 3.527 17.178 5.725 6.319 18.861 
df 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .474 .002 .221 .177 .001 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Length of directorship 
 
As shown in Table 4.24 above, the Kruskal Wallis test revealed that there were 
significant mean rank differences in basic salary, bonuses and total remuneration 
between the different tenure groups. 
 
Table 4.25: Inferential tests: tenure and remuneration additional testing 
 
Length of directorship 
20 years and 
greater 16-20 years 11-15 years 6-10 years 1-5 years 
Basic Salary 2657437.5a,b 3188177.8a 2952559.3a 2773666.7a 2235865.3b 
Bonuses 582437.5a 2191022.2b 1817173.1a,b 1987223.5b 1561980.7a,b 
Total 3746312.5a 6253955.6a,b 5901041.2a,b 7424316.6b 5153353.7a 
 
Note: Values in the same row and sub table not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at 
p < .05 in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Cells with no subscript are not included in the 
test. Tests assume equal variances.1 
1. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost sub table using the 
Bonferroni correction. 
 
As indicated in Table 4.25 above, the IBM SPSS Statistics Custom Tables Module (t-
tests with Bonferroni correction) was used as a post-hoc test to determine the 
specific age group pairs that differed significantly on average. It was found that: 
 The 1 to 5 year group tended to receive lower basic salaries compared to the 
16 to 20 year group. 
 The 1 to 5 year group also tended to receive lower total remuneration 
compared to the 6 to 10 year group. 
 The 20 years or more group tended to receive lower bonuses compared to 
both the 6 to 10 and the 16 to 20 year groups. 
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 The 20 years or more group also tended to receive lower total remuneration 
as compared to the 6 to 10 year group. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Individual regression models were constructed to examine the relationship between 
director remuneration and company performance for South African companies listed 
on the JSE. The regressions performed were in line with those carried out in 
previous studies conducted by Scholtz and Smit (2012) and De Wet (2012). A 
general linear model was then constructed. This model confirmed the results of the 
individual regression models, showing that only the total assets variable, as used as 
one of the company performance variables, had a significant impact on director 
remuneration. The next chapter summarises the results of the study as compared to 
the results of previous studies and concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Summary and Conclusions 
The principal–agent problem and moral hazard are both at the heart of the corporate 
governance debate and the separation of ownership and control in firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Directors are employed by shareholders to manage and control a 
company’s resources on the shareholders’ behalf (Amess and Drake, 2003). The 
agency relationship allows directors to indulge in opportunistic behaviour that serves 
their own interests and not necessarily those of the shareholders (Amess and Drake, 
2003). It was in light of this that the researcher perceived a need to conduct research 
into the relationship executive director remuneration and company performance. 
 
5.1 Summary of the research paper 
This research study examined the relationship between the executive director 
remuneration and company performance of all listed public firms on the JSE from 
2010 to 2014. This study was in line with similar research conducted by Scholtz and 
Smit (2012) on the Alternative Exchange in South Africa and by Theku (2014) who 
focused on the mining industry in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the study, while chapter 2 contained a review of relevant 
literature. Chapter 2 also explained the agency theory and its link to corporate 
governance and, thus, its relevance to this report, as well as the requirements of the 
King Reports, especially King III, and the requirements of the Companies Act and the 
JSE. This was followed by an explanation of the link between corporate governance 
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and company performance. The latter part of the chapter discussed director profiles 
and the components of executive remuneration. 
 
Chapter 3 discussed the main research question as well as the sub-questions. The 
chapter then discussed the research methodology used in the study, including the 
use of a regression model and the research methods applied. The issues of validity 
and reliability were also discussed, as were the assumptions, limitations and 
delimitations of the study.  
 
Chapter 3 also discussed and explained the population and the sample used in the 
study and the data collection methods employed, including the director profile matrix 
that was created. The chapter further explained the analysis of the data and 
delineated the period that had been defined for the purposes of the study. The study 
was limited to JSE listed firms for the period from 2010 to 2014. The sample size for 
study comprised 49 companies across five years, while 708 director records were 
examined across these five years. 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the research findings, including an explanation of the 
descriptive statistics conducted, the regression diagnostics and the results of the 
linear regression model. 
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5.2 Summary of results 
5.2.1 Main research question 
The regression results did not provide support for the proposition that there was a 
positive and significant relationship between director remuneration and company 
performance for South African companies listed on the JSE. Only ‘total assets’, 
which was selected as one of the variables, displayed a significant positive 
relationship between director remuneration and company performance. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Scholtz and Smit (2012) and De Wet (2012). Previous 
research (Scholtz and Smit, 2012; De Wet, 2012) has shown that Tobin’s Q and 
ROA are good measures of company performance. The study showed that ROA only 
had a significant relationship with the retention remuneration variable, while Tobin’s 
Q was not related to director remuneration in any way. These results are consistent 
with the findings of studies conducted by Bradley (2013) and Girma et al. (2003) in 
the UK. 
 
Thus, three of the key variables for company performance, namely, Tobin’s Q, ROA 
and revenue, did not display a positive, significant relationship with director 
remuneration, while total assets was significantly positively related to director 
remuneration. However, it must be noted that the study was subject to limitations 
regarding the definition of the term ‘director remuneration’. The results may have 
been different if the variables had been extended to include long-term incentives or 
options, or to include other company performance variables such as share price at 
financial year-ends. 
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5.2.2 Sub-research questions 
The Mann-Whitney U test, which was used to investigate whether there, was a 
relationship between the gender of directors and executive remuneration, revealed 
that, on average, males tended to be associated with a larger basic salary as 
compared to females as well as with better benefits. This led to the conclusion that, 
in general, male directors in South Africa enjoy a better total remuneration package 
compared to their female counterparts. 
 
The Kruskal Wallis, which was used as a tool to investigate the relationship between 
the age of directors and executive director remuneration, revealed that there were 
significant mean rank differences between all the remuneration variables except for 
retention. It also revealed that directors who were older, usually 50 plus and are 
close to retirement, earned a better total remuneration than their younger 
counterparts did.  
 
This result is consistent with the results of a similar study conducted by Bradley 
(2013) and which found that bonuses were positively correlated to age and that, as 
the age of executive directors’ increased year on year, so did the average bonus 
amount paid to these directors. This study found the same relationship in terms of 
which directors who were older than 60, and the results showed that they earned a 
better bonus then those who were younger.  
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The Kruskal Wallis test, which used to examine the relationship between the race of 
directors and executive remuneration, revealed that there was a significant mean 
rank difference in retention and benefits (only marginally) between the race groups. It 
must be noted, however, that 95% of the director years displayed a highly skewed 
distribution. These results were, therefore, not interpreted and they were rejected. 
Accordingly, the conclusion was drawn that there was no real relationship between 
the race of directors and executive director remuneration. 
 
The Kruskal Wallis test, which was used to examine the relationship between 
executive remuneration and director qualification, revealed that there were significant 
mean rank differences in basic salary, benefits, bonuses and, thus, also total 
remuneration between the different educational level groups. The study found that 
directors with CAs tended to earn less than those with a general BCom degree while 
those with a diploma or other qualification earned less than those directors whose 
educational qualification was not disclosed. 
 
The Kruskal Wallis test, which was also used to examine the relationship between 
director remuneration and tenure, revealed that there were significant mean rank 
differences in basic salary, bonuses and, thus, also total remuneration between the 
different tenure groups. The results showed that directors who had served on boards 
for a period of between 6 and 10 years tended to earn a greater total remuneration 
as compared to any other category.  
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The above findings are consistent with the results of a recent study conducted by 
Bradley (2013) that found that bonuses were negatively correlated to executive and, 
more specifically, CEO remuneration. This implied that bonuses did not increase 
over time because of the increased experience of executive directors (Bradley, 
2013). This study provided similar evidence as it was found that directors with tenure 
of greater than 20 years tended to earn lower bonuses then those with tenure of 
between 6 and 20 years. 
 
The final sub-question on the relationship between directors who attended all 
compulsory meetings and executive director remuneration was not examined as the 
data collected had indicated that all the directors had attended all mandatory 
meetings as required. 
 
5.3 Recommendations and conclusions  
It would seem that the results of the study indicate the lack of a correlation between 
executive director remuneration and company performance for publically listed South 
African companies. However, the results of the regression provided empirical 
support for the proposition that a significant positive relationship existed between 
director remuneration and total assets.  
 
The results showed that there was no significant relationship between director 
remuneration and company performance on an overall level. This finding was 
consistent with the findings of previous studies conducted in South Africa by Bradley 
(2013) as well as those of a UK based study performed by Girma et al. (2003). As 
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mentioned by Bradley (2013), this would seem to suggest that any attempts to align 
the interests of executives and shareholders through executive remuneration have 
been unsuccessful thus far. 
 
De Wet (2012), who conducted a study based on the Johannesburg AltX, mentioned 
in his concluding remarks that South African companies are facing the challenge of 
embracing the notion of stakeholder wealth creation in their objective both to ensure 
that the performance of executives is measured fairly and that these executives are 
remunerated appropriately. However, this was found not to be the case in a study 
conducted by Bradley (2013) on sectors of the JSE listed companies a year after De 
Wet’s study. Bradley (2013) found that the attempts by these companies to use 
executive pay to mitigate the conflict of interest between stakeholders and executive 
directors had failed. The findings of this research paper, which focused on all JSE 
listed companies during 2014, were consistent with Bradley’s findings. 
 
Bradley (2013) mentioned that there was nothing to suggest that it would not be 
possible to link pay to performance in South Africa. However, in order to maximise 
executive performance and to limit the conflict of interests between executives and 
stakeholders, it may be that certain targets would need to be met. These targets 
included a company putting in place a suitable method of measuring performance 
and ensuring a clear and understandable link between company performance and 
executive remuneration.  
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King III notes that shareholders are ultimately responsible for the composition of the 
board. It is in their own interests to ensure that the board is properly constituted with 
regard to both skill and representivity. The procedures in respect of appointments to 
the board should be formal and transparent and should be a matter for the board as 
a whole, assisted by the nomination committee, and subject to shareholder approval 
(IOD, 2009). Thus, the targets as cited by Bradley (2013) should be implemented by 
the shareholders, while these remuneration methods should be made transparent all 
parties involved. In addition, the concept of sound company performance should be 
clearly defined (Bradley, 2013). 
 
The above suggestions of Bradley (2013) are in line with good corporate governance 
measures as well as the IOD’s (2009) suggestion that a board or the shareholders 
should establish a formal induction programme to familiarise incoming directors with 
the company‘s operations, its business environment, and the sustainability issues 
relevant to its business. An article published by Deloitte (2013) further suggests that, 
in addition, the programme should ensure that incoming directors are introduced to 
the members of senior management and familiarised with their respective roles and 
duties.  
 
This induction programme should meet the specific needs of both the company and 
the individuals involved simultaneously and should make it possible for new directors 
to make a positive contribution timeously (IOD, 2009). In order to achieve this 
mentorship on the part of experienced directors is encouraged (Deloitte, 2013). As 
mentioned above, the advantages of formulating a sound programme would help to 
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ensure that the interests of stakeholders and management were aligned as well as 
create a powerful tool for attracting and retaining talented executives (Bradley, 
2013).  
 
5.4 Suggestions for future research 
The results of the study may have been be influenced by the limitations as discussed 
in section 3.4 of this report. However, this does create opportunities for future 
research. 
 
As a result of data availability and time constraints, the study was limited to JSE 
listed companies. Accordingly, there is need to expand future research to include the 
government-owned sectors, to carry out further comparisons of remuneration 
packages or extend the testing to other countries and stock exchanges in order to 
enable significant comparisons to be made. Future studies could also measure the 
impact of director remuneration on company performance in countries with different 
corporate governance legislation and requirements as compared to South Africa. 
Governance needs differ for companies operating in different socio‐political and 
economic conditions while the various remuneration policies should also be taken 
into account. 
 
This study excluded long-term stock options data because of the research time 
constraints and related date accessibility challenges. This resulted in only options as 
disclosed in the annual financial statements being examined. The study also did not 
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take into account director experience in an industry or the industry knowledge of the 
director – both of which may have affected significantly on the findings. In addition, 
the study did not take into account other firm performance variables such as share 
price at year-end, average share price for the year as well as EBITDA. Research 
could also be conducted on certain groupings of companies on the JSE and a 
comparison made between various groups if companies, for example mining versus 
financial or agricultural versus mining. 
 
This research report also did not take into account changes in directors during the 
year and this is an aspect, which could be explored, in future research. The research 
also took into account director-years only as a basis for the statistics whereas a 
comparison may also be done between director-years and company-years. The 
research also focused on executive directors only and, thus, similar future research 
could focus on a comparison between executive and non-executive directors. 
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Appendix A – Company performance variable graphs 
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Appendix B – Director Remuneration variable graphs 
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Appendix C– Linear relationship of variables 
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Source Dependent Variable
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Basic 
Salary
10579805857
8317.750a 4 2.64495E+13 9.628 0
Benefits 62677148877891.000b 4 1.56693E+13 2.622 0.034
Bonuses 252348922902984.000c 4 6.30872E+13 10.915 0
Retention 3389898540566.703d 4 8.47475E+11 7.361 0
Options 21397593565757.000e 4 5.3494E+12 0.512 0.727
Total 1279293031727600.000f 4 3.19823E+14 8.341 0
Basic 
Salary 1.28815E+15 1 1.28815E+15 468.914 0
Benefits 1.14954E+14 1 1.14954E+14 19.237 0
Bonuses 5.865E+14 1 5.865E+14 101.476 0
Retention 4.28309E+12 1 4.28309E+12 37.204 0
Options 9.81292E+13 1 9.81292E+13 9.387 0.002
Total 6.85681E+15 1 6.85681E+15 178.824 0
Basic 
Salary 4.54097E+11 1 4.54097E+11 0.165 0.684
Benefits 4.32281E+12 1 4.32281E+12 0.723 0.395
Bonuses 1.14928E+13 1 1.14928E+13 1.988 0.159
Retention 42893248283 1 42893248283 0.373 0.542
Options 2.73568E+12 1 2.73568E+12 0.262 0.609
Total 1.83357E+13 1 1.83357E+13 0.478 0.489
Basic 
Salary 9.55771E+13 1 9.55771E+13 34.792 0
Benefits 3.69603E+13 1 3.69603E+13 6.185 0.013
Bonuses 2.03227E+14 1 2.03227E+14 35.162 0
Retention 2.84356E+11 1 2.84356E+11 2.47 0.116
Options 7.5982E+12 1 7.5982E+12 0.727 0.394
Total 1.04554E+15 1 1.04554E+15 27.268 0
Basic 
Salary 3.61592E+12 1 3.61592E+12 1.316 0.252
Benefits 2.36912E+11 1 2.36912E+11 0.04 0.842
Bonuses 1.47193E+11 1 1.47193E+11 0.025 0.873
Retention 1.74162E+11 1 1.74162E+11 1.513 0.219
Options 1.40314E+13 1 1.40314E+13 1.342 0.247
Total 1.90069E+13 1 1.90069E+13 0.496 0.482
TobinsQ
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Corrected 
Model
Intercept
Revenue
TotalAssets
Appendix D– General Linear Model 
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Basic 
Salary 3.29221E+12 1 3.29221E+12 1.198 0.274
Benefits 1.25732E+13 1 1.25732E+13 2.104 0.147
Bonuses 1.01295E+13 1 1.01295E+13 1.753 0.186
Retention 2.92221E+12 1 2.92221E+12 25.383 0
Options 1.5102E+11 1 1.5102E+11 0.014 0.904
Total 1.13232E+14 1 1.13232E+14 2.953 0.086
Basic 
Salary 1.93121E+15 703 2.7471E+12
Benefits 4.20082E+15 703 5.97556E+12
Bonuses 4.06313E+15 703 5.7797E+12
Retention 8.09324E+13 703 1.15124E+11
Options 7.34933E+15 703 1.04542E+13
Total 2.69557E+16 703 3.83438E+13
Basic 
Salary 6.71368E+15 708
Benefits 4.59788E+15 708
Bonuses 6.38839E+15 708
Retention 8.74099E+13 708
Options 7.882E+15 708
Total 5.27492E+16 708
Basic 
Salary 2.03701E+15 707
Benefits 4.2635E+15 707
Bonuses 4.31547E+15 707
Retention 8.43223E+13 707
Options 7.37073E+15 707
Total 2.8235E+16 707
c. R Squared = .058 (Adjusted R Squared = .053)
d. R Squared = .040 (Adjusted R Squared = .035)
e. R Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = -.003)
f. R Squared = .045 (Adjusted R Squared = .040)
ROA
Error
Total
Corrected 
Total
a. R Squared = .052 (Adjusted R Squared = .047)
b. R Squared = .015 (Adjusted R Squared = .009)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
